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Abstract The European Short Selling Regulation not only restricts the short selling
of shares but (largely in response to the European sovereign debt crisis) also extends
its reach into regulating the sovereign debt market. In particular, the Regulation
imposes a prohibition on entering into uncovered sovereign credit default swaps
(CDSs): a functionally equivalent mechanism to short selling the underlying bonds.
This paper provides an overview of sovereign CDSs and their uses and places the
concerns voiced about sovereign CDSs in context through an analysis of the rele-
vant economic literature. It then discusses the Regulation’s provisions in the light of
these findings. The paper suggests that there are many benefits to using sovereign
CDSs and little to support the accusations that developments in the sovereign CDS
markets aggravated the sovereign debt crisis. The restrictions may also reduce
interest in the underlying bond markets and so may in fact harm the sovereign
issuers the provisions were designed to protect.
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1 Introduction
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, investors became increasingly concerned
about the financial outlook of a number of countries, including several in the euro
area.1 During the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, a number of politicians
and regulators accused speculators of using uncovered (or naked) sovereign credit
default swaps (CDSs) to exacerbate the fiscal problems of many countries, including
Greece, through raising the borrowing costs of governments. The sovereign debt
crisis sparked the interest of regulators, and the sovereign CDS provisions in the
2012 European Short Selling Regulation (hereinafter ‘the Regulation’) were
predominantly due to the perception that naked sovereign CDS activity contributed
to Europe’s sovereign debt problems and that the speculative use of sovereign CDSs
could destabilise markets. The final rules were highly contested, and were largely a
consequence of political pressures stemming from particular Member States,
supported by the European Parliament (hereinafter ‘the Parliament’).2 This included
the Parliament’s persistent demands with respect to imposing a ban on uncovered
sovereign CDSs.3
Although the EU regime is now relatively well established, the issue of short
selling regulation continues to be a hot topic today, especially when one reflects on
the temporary short selling bans imposed by the Greek authorities during 2015 as
the country teetered on the brink of financial collapse. Likewise, Chinese regulators
also recently pointed the finger of blame at ‘malicious’ short sellers when China’s
stock market experienced dramatic declines during 2015 and early 2016. The
Chinese authorities (amongst other measures) imposed short selling restrictions and
instigated a range of market manipulation probes.
Further, in a broader context, the developments being observed with respect to
short selling regulation at the European level also form part of a wider set of
regulatory changes witnessed in relation to European capital markets regulation
following the recent crises. Specifically, the rules that were in existence at the time
of the market downturn were considered inadequate to cope with the various new
financial players and products, many of which were perceived to constitute a threat
to market stability.4 Consequently, the crises prompted the EU down the path of
more intensive regulation, and its initial regulatory response included a particular
focus on establishing financial and market stability. Such reforms also expanded the
EU’s regulatory perimeter to bring within it issues (including the practice of short
selling) considered in need of regulation at the EU level. Today, although the high
watermark of the post-crisis reforms may now have passed, the kernels of yet a
further wave of changes are now also observable. For instance, current proposals
1 BIS (2013), at p. 5.
2 See, e.g., Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, Letter to President of the European Commission (8 June
2010); European Parliament, Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, 19 April 2011.
3 See, e.g., European Parliament, Crack Down on Short Selling and Sovereign Debt Speculation, 18
October 2011.
4 Moloney (2011), at p. 524.
320 E. Howell
123
include a push to try and widen companies’ financing sources through the EU’s
Capital Markets Union project.5
With this background in mind, this paper provides an overview of sovereign
credit default swaps (CDSs) and their uses and seeks to place the concerns raised
about sovereign CDSs in context through a consideration of the relevant economic
literature. It then examines the requirements introduced by the Regulation that
effectively prohibit naked sovereign CDSs.6 Broadly speaking, the rules only permit
entering into such a transaction where it does not lead to an uncovered position in a
sovereign CDS. This then depends on whether the CDS constitutes a permitted
hedge. Aside from ‘pure’ hedging against the risk of decline in the value of the
sovereign debt, permissible hedging includes ‘proxy’ hedging (i.e., hedging risks of
other assets whose value is correlated to the value of the sovereign debt). However,
in this regard there are a complex set of requirements to be complied with, including
geographical constraints, correlation and proportionality tests. During the Regula-
tion’s protracted negotiations, the Parliament was also forced to concede to a
temporary opt-out from the restrictions if the ban was damaging the government
debt markets.
Although the regulator demonstrated a level of sophistication in recognising that
there is more than one way to carry out a short sale, this paper suggests that the
Regulation’s restrictions are a ‘misconceived response to a non-existent problem’.7
There are many benefits to using sovereign CDSs and little to substantiate the
accusations that developments in such markets led to higher funding costs for
sovereign issuers during the crisis.8 Indeed the rules that have been introduced not
only prohibit uncovered positions but also restrict much legitimate hedging activity.
More generally, the rules may reduce investor interest in the underlying bond
markets in many countries and so may come at the detriment of the sovereign
issuers that the restrictions were in fact seeking to protect.9
2 Terminology: Overview of Credit Derivatives and CDSs
A credit derivative is a general term used to describe various swap and option
contracts designed to assume or lay off credit risk on loans, debt securities or other
assets, or in relation to a particular reference entity or country, in return for either
swap payments or payment of premium.10 Credit risk arises from the possibility of
default on a pre-agreed payment, and the transfer of credit risk is achieved through
5 See, e.g., European Commission Communication, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union
(COM (2015) 468 final).
6 Note that for ease of reference, a table containing some pertinent terms is attached as Appendix 1 to this
paper.
7 Seretakis (2013), at p. 146.
8 Notably, a 2012 report on the CDS market by the International Organisation of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) stated that there was no conclusive evidence on whether taking short positions on credit risk
through naked sovereign CDSs was harmful for high-yield sovereign bonds, see IOSCO (2012), at p. 38.
9 AIMA (2011), at p. 17.
10 Benjamin (2007), para. 4.51.
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the payment obligations of the seller of the swap (also referred to as the ‘protection
seller’) that are triggered by specified events of default (‘credit events’) affecting
defined assets (also known as ‘reference assets’) or defined entities (also known as
‘reference entities’) such as a government or corporate issuer.11
Turning to CDSs, these instruments were conceived as over-the-counter (OTC)
products and are quoted in basis points12 per year. A CDS price indicates the cost
per year to buy or sell exposure to the possibility of a default or restructuring.13
Under the terms of a CDS contract (that will be laid out in documentation using
standard forms),14 the purchaser of the CDS (also known as the ‘protection buyer’)
will be obliged to make specified fee payments (often referred to as the ‘insurance
premium’ or ‘CDS spread’) to the protection seller on an annual basis. The level of
protection is usually expressed in terms of a ‘notional’ amount that is being
protected and the length of time for which the notional amount is being protected.15
Specifically with respect to a sovereign CDS agreement, the seller will receive
the premium in exchange for bearing the risk of capital losses if a pre-defined
default event occurs (including the sovereign’s failure to pay interest or principal on
an obligation) in relation to the referenced sovereign entity and a predefined
notional amount.16 Sovereign CDS contracts are usually denominated in a currency
different from the main currency of the deliverable obligations as it is assumed that,
if faced with a credit event, the local currency will come under pressure.17 CDSs on
euro area sovereigns tend to be denominated in US dollars.
To put these terms in context, if one party wishes to purchase protection on the
notional amount of USD one hundred million of debt issued by a sovereign for
5 years, and the agreed CDS rate is five per cent per year, the party will pay a yearly
premium to the protection seller of USD five million. If a credit event occurs in the
5 years, the seller will give the buyer the difference between the referenced debt and
the market value of the defaulted debt. For example, if, due to the credit event, the
debt now has only a market value of USD thirty million, the buyer will collect USD
seventy million from the seller.18
Where an investor purchases a sovereign CDS without having some kind of
exposure to the credit risk associated with the underlying bond (i.e., where the
11 Ibid, at para. 4.51; European Commission (2010), at p. 7.
12 For further details, see Appendix 1.
13 European Commission (2010), at p. 8.
14 The standard forms are most often produced by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA).
15 AIMA (2011), at p. 20.
16 Ibid, at p. 20. Note that in March 2012, the restructuring of Greek sovereign debt triggered payments
by protection sellers of approximately USD 2.89 billion. Although there were concerns that a large flow
of payments to buyers of CDS protection could have had a material systemic impact on the financial
system at large (this was particularly related to the possibly high concentration of the exposures on a few
protection sellers), the impact of the credit event was remarkably low. See, e.g., H Cunningham, ‘DTCC
helps ensure ‘‘uneventful’’ Greek CDS payout’, DTCC, 1 May 2012; IOSCO (2012), at pp. 15–18.
17 BIS (2013), at p. 5.
18 Duffie (2010), p. 56. Settlement can also be either in cash or by physical settlement although CDS
contracts are typically cash settled.
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investor does not hold the debt instruments or have some exposure to the debt), this
is described as having an uncovered or naked sovereign CDS.19
2.1 Uses of Sovereign CDSs
Owners of sovereign debt purchase sovereign CDSs as a direct hedging tool in order
to protect them from loss arising from a default or other credit event affecting the
value of the underlying sovereign debt.20 Sovereign CDSs can also be used for
arbitrage opportunities (i.e., the risk-free exploitation of price differences in
connected markets) in the government bond markets.21 Traders can try and exploit
pricing differences between CDSs and the underlying debt obligations by taking
offsetting positions between the two (known as ‘basis trading’).22
Naked sovereign CDSs are also often purchased as ‘proxy’ risk management
tools in order to hedge risks of other assets, such as national banks or utility
companies whose value is correlated to the value of the sovereign debt.23 For
instance, if one invests in a national airline and wants to protect against the
downside risk of a sovereign crisis affecting the airline, one could purchase a
sovereign CDS without owning the underlying government debt.24 Similarly,
sovereign CDSs are also often used as a proxy to hedge positions in analogous
instruments (e.g., in bank debt) for which a CDS may not be traded (or which
may be highly illiquid and therefore expensive).25 Such positions help fill a
gap by allowing investors to hedge country- or sector-specific risks and also
support projects that would not be financed otherwise.26 Although, as will be
observed at Sect. 5 below, the EU provisions aim to ensure that legitimate
proxy hedging activity can still be classified as ‘covered’ positions, the many
uncertainties introduced by the complex European rules mean such activity
may simply become too cumbersome or costly to be worthwhile for market
participants.
Finally, purchasing a naked sovereign CDS can also be used to reflect a negative
opinion about the credit outlook of the sovereign issuer of the underlying bonds.27 It
is economically equivalent to short selling the underlying bonds, and both naked
CDS purchases and short selling bonds provide useful functions by increasing the
19 European Commission (2010), at p. 7.
20 IMF (2013), at p. 3.
21 Ibid, at pp. 3 and 23, and European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying Document to the
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on short selling and certain
aspects of credit default swaps, SEC(2010) 1055, at p. 15.
22 IMF (2013), at pp. 3 and 23; Impact Assessment, supra n. 21, at p. 15. See Appendix 1 for further
details. See also Sect. 3 below.
23 IMF (2013), at p. 3.
24 IMF, IMF Staff Comments on Commission Consultation on Short Selling, August 2010, at p. 7.
25 FSA, HMT and Debt Management Office, Joint FSA/HMT/Debt Management Office Response to the
European Commission Public Consultation on Short Selling (2010), at p. 10.
26 del Marmol (2011), at p. 58.
27 IMF (2013), at pp. 3, 19.
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liquidity of the underlying markets.28 Further, naked CDS purchases also help to
keep prices from merely reflecting the activity of only the most optimistic market
participants.29
Naked sovereign CDSs provide a relatively simple mechanism for taking a short
position and reflecting a negative view of the evolving credit risk associated with a
sovereign reference entity: they are a ‘highly visible bellwether of a country’s
perceived credit risk’.30 Although other mechanisms can also be used to express
views on the credit risk associated with a sovereign issuer (including short selling
the underlying bonds or using other derivatives), such instruments can also reflect
other risk as well as credit risk.31 In contrast, the CDS market is more standardised:
for example, sovereign CDSs on Greece all have the unique reference, which is the
credit risk of Greece.32 Equally, there is not the same required outlay to enter into a
short position on the CDS market as there is with purchasing a bond.33 Finally, in
general terms, it can often be harder to short sell bonds than to purchase a naked
CDS.34 Indeed, this is particularly the case in the corporate bond market, where the
secondary market is often illiquid.35 In contrast however, the government bond
market is generally much more liquid than its corporate counterpart, meaning the
bond market may play a bigger role for sovereigns.36
2.2 Size of the Sovereign CDS Market
Turning to examine the size of the sovereign CDS market in more detail, this
Section will illustrate that the sovereign CDS market is only a relatively minor part
of the overall CDS market, which is itself only a small part of the OTC derivatives
market. Further, sovereign CDSs are only a small fraction of the total government
debt outstanding.37 It is also helpful to keep this in mind in Sect. 3 below that will
then examine whether sovereign CDS prices are in fact capable of manipulating
bond prices.
There are two basic measures of the size of the CDS market: the gross notional
amount and the net notional amount. The gross notional amount is the total of all
transactions that have not yet matured, prior to taking into consideration offsetting
28 Ibid, at p. 19.
29 Ibid, at p. 19.
30 AIMA (2011), at p. 5. CDS prices provide useful information about the credit risk of an entity and the
CDS price theoretically reflects the credit risk of the reference entity, see del Marmol (2011), at p. 25.
31 IMF (2013), at p. 3. For instance, there can be interest rate risk attached to bonds.
32 Impact Assessment, supra n. 21, at p. 16.
33 Ibid, at p. 16.
34 For instance, one needs to be able to borrow a sufficient quantity of bonds and deep repurchase
agreement (‘repo’) markets in which to borrow them, IMF (2013), at p. 19.
35 Coudert and Gex (2013), at pp. 493, 499–500. Corporate issuers may also have different bonds with
varying maturities leading to high fragmentation of the secondary market. See del Marmol (2011), at
p. 24.
36 Coudert and Gex (2013), at p. 495. However, the funding conditions and liquidity of the government
bond market can vary from state to state.
37 IMF (2013), at p. 4.
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transactions between pairs of counterparties. However, this measure can be
misleading as it can significantly overstate the size of the market.38 For instance,
market participants will commonly enter into offsetting transactions, and this will
raise the number of outstanding transactions, resulting in an increase in the overall
gross notional amounts.
Instead, the net notional amount takes into account all offsetting transactions
between pairs of counterparties. For instance, if an investor has bought protection on
USD 10 million of sovereign debt and decides to reduce this position to USD 4
million, it will enter into a new offsetting CDS agreement to sell protection on USD
6 million of sovereign debt, and the investor’s net position will then be USD 4
million.39 The net notional amount is the basis for calculating the net notional
payment in the event of a credit event and represents the maximum amount that
could change hands if the reference entity defaults.40 This is a more realistic
measure as an increase in net notional exposure indicates there is increased demand
for credit risk protection.41
2.2.1 BIS: Size of the CDS Market Within the OTC Market
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provides information on a semi-annual
basis with respect to the OTC derivatives market.42 This data helps provide a
general overview of the size of the CDS and sovereign CDS market, particularly in
comparison with the overall OTC derivatives market. Nonetheless, the data also
suffers from limitations: it only provides aggregate market statistics and is based on
surveys rather than actual registered positions in the market.43
Although in 2007 CDSs came close to surpassing foreign exchange derivatives as
the second largest segment in the global OTC derivatives market, notional amounts
of all CDSs have since declined steadily.44 For instance, according to the BIS semi-
annual survey, by the end of 2013 the global OTC derivatives market constituted
approximately USD 710.2 trillion, and the gross notional amount outstanding of the
total CDS market was approximately USD 21 trillion (approximately 3 per cent of
the total OTC market), down from its peak of approximately USD 58 trillion at the
38 European Commission (2010), at p. 10.
39 Duffie (2010), at p. 56.
40 European Commission (2010), at pp. 10–11; AIMA (2011), at p. 13.
41 AIMA (2011), at p. 14.
42 BIS (2014). Central banks and other authorities from 13 jurisdictions participate in this survey
(Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the UK and the US). The market share of dealers participating in the survey varies but is
almost 100 % in the credit category, see ibid, at p. 10. Although BIS also conducted a triennial survey
reflecting end-June 2013, BIS noted that dealers participating in the semi-annual survey accounted for
almost all outstanding CDS contracts, see BIS (2013), at p. 3.
43 Oehmke and Zawadowski (2014). Hence, it runs the related risk of double counting.
44 Note that for an overview of the forthcoming data in tabular form, plus a comparison between 2013
and 2011, see Appendix 2, Table 1.
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end of 2007.45 CDSs constituted the third segment in the OTC derivatives market,
with interest rate derivatives accounting for the majority of OTC derivatives,
followed by foreign exchange derivatives. By sector, sovereign CDSs constituted
only approximately USD 2.6 trillion of all CDSs at the end of 2013 in terms of gross
notional amounts outstanding: approximately 12.53 per cent of the CDS market.46
2.2.2 Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) Data
The DTCC provides information on CDSs at the reference entity level.47 According
to the DTCC, their data captures approximately 95 per cent of globally traded CDSs,
making it the most accurate and comprehensive publicly available dataset for CDS
positions and trading.48
Since October 2008, the DTCC has provided weekly CDS position data,
disclosing the aggregate gross notional as well as the aggregate net notional
outstanding on a particular reference entity. At the end of 2008, the top ten
outstanding net notional sovereign CDS positions included the following EU
sovereigns: Italy, USD 18 billion; Spain, USD 14 billion, Germany, USD 10 billion;
and Greece, USD 7 billion.49 In contrast, by the end of 2010, the sovereign CDS
market had increased in size: for instance, the top ten positions outstanding included
Italy, USD 26 billion; France, USD 18 billion; Spain, USD 17 billion; Germany,
USD 15 billion; UK, USD 12 billion; Portugal, USD 8 billion; and Austria, USD 7
billion.50
However, while the market has undoubtedly increased in importance since 2008,
it is still small in terms of its relative size to the government debt market. For
example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) calculated that there was
approximately USD 50 trillion total government debt outstanding at the end of
2011.51 In contrast, there were only approximately USD 3 trillion sovereign CDSs
outstanding at that time.52 Similarly, a 2012 report on the CDS market by the
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) observed that the
45 BIS (2014), at p. 7. This figure includes single and multi-name instruments. Note that to an extent the
overall reduction in the size of outstanding CDS positions since 2007 has been assisted by the industry
technique of ‘trade tear-ups’ or ‘portfolio compression’. For further details, see Appendix 1. The decline
in overall CDS activity over the years has also been due to a contraction in inter-dealer activity, see BIS
(2014), at p. 5.
46 Percentages calculated based on the information in the BIS statistical release (May 2014), see BIS
(2014). Out of 2.6 trillion, approximately 2.5 trillion were single-name sovereign CDSs.
47 All major dealers register their standard CDS trades with the DTCC, which enters these into a Trade
Information Warehouse (TIW).
48 Oehmke and Zawadowski (2014), at p. 8.
49 IMF (2013), at p. 4. Figures drawn from DTCC data and IMF calculations.
50 Greece was below the top ten of outstanding positions at USD 6 billion. The prominence of Italy could
have reflected dealers hedging counterparty risk associated with large uncollateralised OTC transactions
with Italy. Likewise, the increased amount of sovereign CDS activity referencing Germany and the UK
reflected them serving as a safe haven trade or proxy hedge. IMF (2013), at pp. 4–5.
51 This was defined as an aggregate of the general government debt that had notional amounts
outstanding in terms of sovereign CDSs.
52 IMF (2013), at p. 4; BIS (2012), Table 7 (gross notional amount).
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size of the CDS market relative to public debt for euro area sovereigns had remained
relatively stable since 2008, contrary to the perception that the debt crisis had
increased the demand for CDSs for hedging purposes.53 Indeed, IOSCO also noted
that the ratio of net notional to public debt had remained stable or had actually
decreased for countries more exposed to the crisis including Greece, Ireland and
Portugal.54
As observed at the start of this Section, this data helps to illustrate that the
sovereign CDS market is only a small part of the overall CDS market, which itself is
only a minor segment of the OTC derivatives market. Further, sovereign CDSs
represent only a small fraction of the total government debt outstanding.55 It is
useful to keep these points in mind when moving to examine the interaction
between the sovereign CDS and bond markets in Sect. 3. Finally, and more
generally, given the very small size of the sovereign CDS market, it is also relevant
to ask whether this market should have been such a concern for regulators,
particularly in comparison with other, much larger, derivatives markets.
3 Interaction Between the Sovereign CDS and Bond Markets
3.1 Introduction
As already observed, during the sovereign debt crisis, politicians and regulators
contended that the interaction between the bond and CDS markets could result in
mispricing on the bond market and lead to higher funding costs for governments.56
Essentially, when investors are concerned about a country’s financial stability, they
will demand higher returns (i.e., higher yields) on government bonds to compensate
for the higher level of risk, and this will increase a country’s cost of borrowing.57
Further, if the default probability on a bond increases, parties holding CDSs will
profit from the increasing value of their position.58 The common assertion of
53 IOSCO (2012), at pp. 7–9.
54 Ibid, at p. 9.
55 IMF (2013), at p. 4. Indeed, also compare the figures with earlier data produced by the Hedge Fund
Standards Board (HFSB). The HFSB noted that at the end of 2009, CDSs constituted only 5 per cent of
the overall OTC derivatives market (gross figures) and sovereign CDSs constituted approximately only 11
per cent of the overall CDS market (net figures) in April 2010, and that the sovereign CDS market was
small in terms of relative size to government debt (sovereign CDSs were approximately 1 per cent of
government debt) in May 2010, see HFSB, HFSB Response to the European Commission Public
Consultation on Short Selling (2010), at p. 8.
56 Impact Assessment, supra n. 21, at p. 24.
57 Investors will start selling bonds to reduce exposure to government debt, pushing interest rates higher.
Further, if bond yields are higher, the interest rate costs for the country will be much greater and the
government will have to spend a large proportion of tax revenues on interest payments making it difficult
to reduce government debt (and it will also be difficult for a government to raise new money as it has to
pay an interest rate that is acceptable to the market).
58 Economic and Monetary Affairs Policy Department: European Parliament, Assessment of the
cumulative impact of the various regulatory initiatives on the European banking sector, Brussels, August
2011, at p. 20.
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regulators and governments is that a rise in CDS prices will lead to a collapse in the
underlying bond market prices, leading to higher funding costs for governments.59
Consequently, during the crisis, regulators and governments became concerned
about the incentives of CDS traders and that they could seek to speculate on a
country’s default.60 Specifically, a letter from German Chancellor Merkel and
French President Sarkozy to the Commission President in March 2010 demanded an
inquiry into speculative practices in connection with CDS trading of government
bonds. They stated that if such an examination demonstrated that such practices
were having an impact on the development of bond yields, it should be considered
whether it was necessary to pass appropriate legislation.61
With this in mind, the interaction between the two markets should be analysed as
to whether CDS prices are capable of manipulating bond prices. Specifically, for
some, any evidence that CDS prices can sometimes lead price developments is then
interpreted as indirectly demonstrating that CDS prices can manipulate bond prices
and that restrictions should be introduced.62
This Section discusses the relevant economic literature that broadly suggests that
the sovereign CDS market contributes to credit market price discovery but that the
market is not perfectly ‘efficient’ or necessarily more price informative than the
bond market with respect to credit risk.63 Further, the findings that the CDS market
sometimes incorporates information faster than the bond market is not evidence that
there is anything the matter with the CDS market, and nor should the findings be
used as indirect evidence that CDS prices are capable of manipulating bond prices,
driving up the cost of government funding.64 Indeed the European Commission’s
(hereinafter ‘the Commission’) own Task Force that was set up to examine the
effects of CDS trading during the sovereign debt crisis concluded that there was no
conclusive evidence that developments in the sovereign CDS market had caused
higher funding costs for Member States.65
3.2 Does One Market Lead the Other?
3.2.1 Overview
CDSs relate to the credit risk of an issuer: the risk of default of the issuer on its
obligations towards its creditors. Equally, a bond purchaser is also exposed to
various risks, including the credit risk that the issuer of the bond may not return the
59 AIMA (2011), at p. 14.
60 Economic and Monetary Affairs Policy Department: European Parliament, supra n. 58, at p. 20.
61 S Fidler, ‘What Sarkozy, Merkel wrote on CDS’, The Wall Street Journal, 11 March 2010.
62 AIMA (2011), at p. 7; IMF (2013), at p. 15. Broadly, the argument is that if CDS market movements
cause movements in the underlying bond market, this provides easy manipulation opportunities.
63 Shadab (2010), at p. 458; IMF (2013), at p. 24.
64 IMF (2013), at p. 15. Rather, what policymakers can legitimately worry about is manipulative shorting
behaviour.
65 European Commission (2010), at pp. 21–22.
328 E. Howell
123
bond’s principal amount at maturity.66 More technically, economists explain the
relationship as follows: if one takes the yield of a bond with a credit risk and
subtracts the yield of a comparable bond that is free from credit risk, the credit risk
spread component can be isolated.67 The credit spread of a bond of a particular
sovereign and the CDS spread (or premium) for that sovereign should be closely
linked as they both measure credit risk compensation for the sovereign (this is
described as the ‘no arbitrage’ relationship).68 The academic literature suggests that
in a perfect market without frictions, both markets should be equally efficient and
should adjust simultaneously when there is new information on credit risk: price
discovery should occur at the same time.69
In practice, however, due to various market imperfections,70 the difference
between the CDS spread and the bond spread (the basis) tends not to be zero in the
short run and can at times become sizeable.71 Such imperfections have led to
researchers investigating, amongst other issues, which of the markets (the CDS or
the bond market) is the more informationally efficient (i.e., which market leads price
movements and reflects credit risk more efficiently).72 There was already some
existing consensus that the CDS market was more efficient than the bond market
regarding price discovery for corporate reference entities.73 Such findings are in line
with the greater liquidity of the corporate CDS market compared with the secondary
corporate bond market (which is often illiquid), making it more straightforward to
buy a CDS than to trade the bond.74 However, the economic empirical findings have
been much more mixed for sovereign entities.
Appendix 2 to this paper summarises the main empirical work in this relatively
young field of literature, and it is clear that the mixed findings in this area can, to an
extent, be attributed to different methodological choices, including the use of
66 Impact Assessment, supra n. 21, at p. 14.
67 BIS (2013), at pp. 5-6. See also Duffie (1990), p. 73. Note that most papers compare CDS spreads to
bond spreads rather than bond yields. Bond spreads are the difference between the bond yield and the
‘interest rate swap’ (i.e., the risk-free rate), although some papers use German bonds as the risk-free
measure.
68 BIS (2013), at pp. 5–6.
69 Chan-Lau and Kim (2004), at pp. 3–4.
70 For instance, there may be differences in the relative liquidity of the two markets (i.e., the number of
participants in a given market); there may be costs attached to shorting bonds; tax effects; and other
factors, including counterparty risks.
71 BIS (2013), at p. 6. At some point however, arbitrage opportunities will become feasible, enabling
investors to profit from the non-zero basis, and it will tend to revert back to zero in the long run.
72 Augustin (2014).
73 See, e.g., Blanco et al. (2005), at p. 2255; Zhu (2006), at p. 211. This means the CDS market leads the
bond market and is responsible for price movements.
74 Coudert and Gex (2013), at p. 499. Indeed, IOSCO reported that, globally, net CDS exposure to
private entities was four times higher than to sovereign entities at the end of 2011, see IOSCO (2012), at
pp. 7. IOSCO did observe, however, that although current research clearly showed that CDSs led the price
discovery process for private issuers, it was not clear whether this depended on the fact that CDSs were
more liquid than bonds, or rather on the fact that short positions were easier to take in the CDS market.
IOSCO also observed that these were not necessarily alternative explanations, see ibid, at pp. 36–38.
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different samples, time periods and data sources.75 Nevertheless, overall, the
literature (including, crucially, the report of the Commission’s own Task Force)
broadly illustrates that the changes in spreads in the sovereign CDS and the bond
market are mainly contemporaneous and that each market is equally likely to lead
the other.76
Notably, some of the findings also illustrate the relevance of counterparty risk in
impeding the role of CDSs in price discovery: a factor that is particularly relevant
given the over-the-counter (OTC) nature of the CDS market. Counterparty risk will
have a negative effect on CDS prices: specifically the ability of the CDS market to
lead the price discovery process will be impaired when levels of counterparty risk
are high due to the perception of a lower quality of protection being sold.77
Consequently, proposals to push such sovereign CDSs into centralised clearing
under related European legislative developments would help improve the role of
sovereign CDSs in price formation by reducing counterparty credit risk.78
3.2.2 Sovereign Debt Crisis: Main Empirical Findings
Broadly, the literature suggests that the informational value of sovereign CDSs has
become more important as the market has matured, but that the market is not
perfectly ‘efficient’ or necessarily more price informative than the bond market with
respect to credit risk.79 The sovereign CDS market sometimes leads the bond
market, the bond market sometimes leads the CDS market, and price discovery is
equally likely to occur in either market.80
Among the most directly relevant papers is the report of the Commission’s Task
Force on Sovereign CDSs that was mandated to examine sovereign CDS activity
during the sovereign debt crisis. The report found no evidence of obvious mispricing
in either the CDS or the bond market. It stated that CDS spreads for more troubled
countries were cheap relative to the bond spreads, implying that CDS spreads could
hardly be considered to be causing the high bond yields in these countries.81 This
was also consistent with a sufficient supply of insurance being offered to troubled
countries and with speculators acting as insurance providers at such times. This
75 Augustin (2014), at p. 21; BIS (2013), at p. 4. For findings relating to emerging markets, see, e.g.,
Chan-Lau and Kim (2004); Ammer and Cai (2011), at p. 369.
76 European Commission (2010), at pp. 21–26; Seretakis (2013), at p. 135. Seretakis also notes that in
cases where price changes in the CDS market did lead changes in the underlying bond market, the
changes in CDS spreads were linked to fundamentals responding to country-specific events, see ibid, at
p. 135.
77 Arce et al. (2013), at p. 127; Levy (2009), at p. 35. Levy’s findings also suggested that changes in the
relative liquidity in the two markets could explain why there was no consistent pattern of one market
leading the other. See Appendix 2.
78 See Sect. 3.2.2 for problems with this proposal, however.
79 Shadab (2013), at p. 458; IMF (2013), at p. 10; Augustin (2014), at p. 24.
80 There may be good reasons why there are particular periods when one market leads the other,
including which market has the higher liquidity on a given day, see European Commission (2010), at
pp. 16; IOSCO (2012), at pp. 36.
81 European Commission (2010), at pp. 21–22.
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could be considered beneficial as it allowed institutional investors to take on more
debt and keep the yields for such countries lower than otherwise would be
possible.82 Next, the spreads in the two markets were mainly contemporaneous and
the vast majority of countries showed no lead or lag behaviour. When not changing
contemporaneously, either the CDS or the bond market was equally likely to lead or
lag the other, and the report concluded that price discovery was equally likely to
occur on the CDS or the bond market.83
Likewise, a 2013 paper by Arce et al. suggested that although the CDS market
led price discovery in most euro areas in normal times, during periods of acute stress
in the eurozone, the bond market led the price discovery process. The authors also
re-emphasised the importance of levels of counterparty risk in explaining some of
the variation in the price discovery process. In particular, they observed that
increased levels of counterparty risk impaired the ability of the CDS market to lead
the price discovery process due to the perception of a lower quality of protection
being sold.84 Finally, research conducted by the IMF observed that sovereign CDSs
tended to reveal information quicker during times of stress but not at other times,
and that the informational value of CDSs had become more important but varied
widely over countries and over time.85 Notably, the IMF concluded that, overall, the
evidence did not support the need to ban purchases of naked CDS protection.86
The findings that the CDS market sometimes incorporates information faster than
the bond market does not provide evidence that there is anything wrong with the
CDS market, nor should it be used as indirect evidence that CDS prices are capable
of manipulating bond prices, driving up the cost of government funding.87 Indeed, a
qualitative paper by Duffie observed that in the case of financially weaker European
sovereigns, as the aggregate net CDSs represented such an insufficient portion of the
total debt outstanding, CDSs would not be able to manipulate and affect the
underlying debt.88
Duffie noted that setting aside the fact that it was very difficult to profit from
manipulation, achieving a sizeable price impact (through aggressive purchases of
naked CDSs) would require manipulators to take positions that were large relative to
the underlying debt.89 The author specifically analysed the case of Greece and
82 Ibid, at p. 22.
83 Ibid, at p. 25. See also Fontana and Scheicher (2010); O’Kane (2012), March–April 2012 (both
detailed in Appendix 2), for similar findings.
84 Arce et al. (2013), at p. 127. See further details in Appendix 2. See also Delis and Mylonidis (2011), at
p. 163 (detailed in Appendix 2), which found that CDSs lost their leading role in the price discovery
process during stressful conditions. See BIS (2013) and Palladini and Portes (2011), (both detailed in
Appendix 2) for findings that the CDS market leads the bond market for most countries in terms of price
discovery.
85 IMF (2013), at p. 10.
86 Ibid, at p. 1; See also IMF (2010) Meeting new challenges to stability and building a safer system,
April 2010, at pp. 46–48, where the IMF cautioned against a ban on naked sovereign CDSs.
87 IMF (2013), at p. 15.
88 Duffie (2010), at p. 57; del Marmol (2011), at p. 59.
89 Duffie (2010), at p. 57. He also observed that manipulation through spreading false information would
also be difficult to achieve, see ibid, at pp. 57–8.
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observed that the aggregate of net CDS positions for Greece had remained well
under three per cent of the total amount of Greek debt outstanding between October
2008 and July 2010.90 He concluded that even if all the holders of CDSs on Greece
had been pure speculators, this would only have had a minor effect on
bondholders.91
Ultimately, the literature broadly demonstrates that the sovereign CDS market
contributes to credit market price discovery,92 but that there is no strong evidence
conclusively linking sovereign CDS trading with instability in the bond market.93
Indeed, in line with Duffie’s paper, given the tiny size of the sovereign CDS market
compared with the underlying bond market, manipulation of the latter by the former
would be very difficult to achieve.94
Further, on a related point to these findings, given that counterparty risk can
clearly impede the ability of the CDS market to lead the price discovery process,
moving sovereign CDSs through centralised clearing would reduce counterparty
risk and help improve the contribution of sovereign CDSs to price discovery.95
However, it is also recognised in this regard that it is trickier to centrally clear
sovereign CDSs than other derivatives. Specifically central counterparties (CCPs)
are reluctant to clear sovereign CDSs due to concerns about ‘wrong-way’ risks.
Clearing participants are required to post collateral to cover losses, and as this will
be in the same currency as that underlying the sovereign CDS contract, the distress
of a sovereign could lead to a vicious cycle that will impair the value of the
collateral while increasing the risk in the CDS contract.96 Aside from this concern
and on a more practical point, sovereigns are also likely to be out of scope of the
centralised clearing requirements introduced in the European Market Infrastructure
Regulation (EMIR).97
90 Ibid, at p. 57. He further observed that in every week since the DTCC had started reporting market-
wide CDS positions, the increase in aggregate protection bought against Greek sovereign debt was less
than 0.18 per cent of the total Greek sovereign debt outstanding.
91 See also Stulz (2010), at p. 83, who, in the context of the financial crisis, argued that CDS trading did
not of itself lead to an acceleration of the turbulence leading to the default of Lehman Brothers. Likewise,
see Shadab (2013), at p. 458, who noted that concerns about market manipulation should be carefully
balanced against the role played by CDSs in contributing to credit market price discovery.
92 Shadab (2013), at p. 458.
93 Moloney (2014), at p. 542; IOSCO (2012), at pp. 1, 38.
94 Impact Assessment, supra n. 21, at p. 25. Further, even if one believed that price discovery in the
sovereign CDS market was in fact indirect evidence in favour of price speculation driving up public
borrowing costs, the ambiguous empirical results should caution against making any drastic regulatory
changes that could negatively affect the ‘efficient information transmission in financial markets’,
Augustin (2014), at pp. 29–30.
95 Central clearing would enforce strong risk management standards, multilateral netting of positions and
sharing of extreme losses, IMF (2013), at p. 17.
96 Ibid, at pp. 17–8.
97 ISDA, Overview of US and EU OTC derivatives regulatory reforms (2014), at p. 7.
332 E. Howell
123
4 Banning Naked Sovereign CDSs?
In March and April 2010, the German regulator BaFin and the Chair of CESR
commented that there was no evidence of CDSs being used to speculate on
government bonds.98 Despite this, both Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy
started to raise concerns as to the possible role played by CDSs in relation to the
price of Greek government bonds. Subsequently, in May 2010, concerns that naked
sovereign CDSs were being used to ‘gamble’ on the health of sovereigns led to
BaFin introducing a ban on naked sovereign CDSs on euro-area government
bonds.99 BaFin justified the ban on the basis of exceptional volatility in euro-area
bonds and the danger that excessive price shifts could trigger significant
disadvantages for financial markets and threaten the stability of the entire financial
system.100 Nevertheless, given the unilateral nature of the act, it was likely to have
been politically driven, especially caused by pressure on Chancellor Merkel within
her own political party in relation to the German response to the Greek debt crisis.
Indeed, the feeling that Germany had also acted to improve its own finances was
compounded by its ability to simultaneously issue new debt at the cheapest rate
since 1998, aided by the short squeeze created by the ban.101
4.1 Impact of the German Ban
A 2012 paper by Pu and Zhang specifically analysed the global impact of the
German ban on the sovereign CDS market and examined five-year sovereign CDS
spreads over the period 12 October 2000 to 5 April 2011.102 The authors considered
the time trend of CDS spreads, volatility, liquidity, and macroeconomic conditions
across fifty-four countries, including the ‘PIIGS’ countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece and Spain).103 In line with the majority of the wider short selling literature
that analysed the impact of short selling bans during the financial crisis, the authors
98 In April 2010, CESR Chair Eddy Wymeersch was quoted as saying that CESR had not seen clear signs
of any speculation or abuse in these markets. See, e.g., AFME, ISLA and ISDA Joint Response to the
European Commission’s Public Consultation on Short Selling (9 July 2010), at p. 13. Equally, the
German regulator BaFin came to a similar conclusion in March 2010. It clarified that, based on its
monitoring of the markets for government bonds and CDSs of selected countries within the euro area, it
had not found any evidence of CDSs being used to speculate against Greek government bonds, see BaFin
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, ‘BaFin clarifies: so far no evidence of massive speculation
against Greek bonds’, BaFin News Release 8 March 2010.
99 The ban also covered naked short sales on sovereign debt, and naked short sales of shares in particular
banks and insurers. See A Crawford, ‘Germany to temporarily ban naked short selling, some swaps of
euro bonds’, Bloomberg, 18 May 2010.
100 S-M Ishmael, ‘BaFin statement on Germany’s naked short selling ban’, FT Alphaville, 18 May 2010.
Germany subsequently made the ban permanent in July 2010.
101 HWilson, ‘Markets crash as German short-selling ban bites’, The Telegraph, 19 May 2010. Indeed, it
is likely that such a ban created more of a preference for ‘safe’ German bonds (a ‘flight to safety’),
meaning lower funding costs for Germany compared with other countries.
102 Pu and Zhang (2012), at pp. 176–7.
103 Ibid, at pp. 172–176. The sample included the PIIGS countries, seven other eurozone countries,
fifteen non-eurozone European countries, nine Asian countries, seven Middle Eastern countries, eight
South American countries, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
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found that CDS spreads continued to rise after the ban in the debt crisis region and
that market liquidity was also impaired for the PIIGS countries.104 However, in
contrast to the effect of short sale bans on the equity markets, the authors did
observe that the ban helped reduce CDS volatility.105 The authors also observed that
sovereign CDS spreads were closely related to a country’s macroeconomic
conditions: for instance, the PIIGS countries, whose CDS spreads had increased
considerably since early 2010, had slower economic growth, lower reserves and
higher debt in gross domestic product (GDP).106
Overall the authors’ findings demonstrated that where a sovereign entity could
not improve its economic condition, banning speculation on naked CDSs or short
bond positions was not capable of ‘suppressing the rampantly rising sovereign
yields’.107
4.2 Impact of a Permanent Prohibition?
With this in mind, before turning to examine the provisions now introduced by the
Regulation, it is also helpful to reflect on the possible implications of a permanent
prohibition on naked sovereign CDSs. First, it is likely that a permanent prohibition
would destroy the market.108 For instance, if the CDS market consisted of only
hedgers, these market participants would not find counterparties, as the market
would have no liquidity.109 Indeed, the presence in the market of those who
previously purchased naked sovereign CDSs and were then able to take the other
side and sell protection could also help mitigate volatility during crisis times.110
Hence, the absence of such market participants could in fact lead to less rather than
more stability.111 Further, in a 2010 paper, Stulz observed that there was no
evidence that removing naked purchases of CDSs would help the economy ‘any
more than attempts to reduce stock short-sales did during the crisis’.112
A 2010 paper by Duffie reiterated these points, noting that regulations restricting
speculation in the CDS market could have the unintended consequence of reducing
market liquidity and this would raise trading execution costs for other investors who
were not speculating.113 Indeed, in line with Pu and Zhang’s findings, imposing
104 Ibid, at p. 173. The majority of the short selling literature reported that short selling bans usually lead
to an increase in bid-ask spreads for banned stocks, see, e.g., Boehmer et al. (2013), at p. 1363; Clifton
and Snape (2008).
105 Pu and Zhang (2012), at pp. 172–3. The authors noted that this could be due to shrinking speculation
activities after the ban. Due to the ban, investors could be cautious as to using CDSs to express their view
on the sovereign credit risk and might be forced to unwind their position.
106 Ibid, at p. 173.
107 Ibid, at p. 172.
108 Stulz (2010), at p. 85.
109 Ibid, at p. 85.
110 AIMA (2011), at p. 15.
111 Ibid, at p. 15.
112 Stulz (2010), at p. 85.
113 Duffie (2010), at p. 58. He also noted that it would lower the quality of information provided by CDS
rates regarding the credit quality of bond issuers.
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restrictions could in fact have the opposite effect to that which is intended and
increase the borrowing costs for sovereign issuers.114 Equally, making the hedging
of sovereign debt more challenging could also discourage the purchase of sovereign
debt, which could also have knock-on effects on interest rates and public deficits.115
Further, by attempting to ban traders with negative information or beliefs, economic
problems could also be delayed by ‘closing the collective eyes of the market’.116
Next, introducing a prohibition on naked sovereign CDSs would likely be
ineffective. For instance, as will be discussed further in Sect. 5 below, as there are
substitute strategies that can be used, such a ban (particularly in the absence of
supranational coverage) may only encourage market participants to engage in
regulatory arbitrage and move their positions into other assets correlated with
sovereign risk that could also involve less transparent instruments, or to offshore
jurisdictions.117 Indeed, spillover into other markets could come with the
unintended consequence of reducing financial stability.118 With this in mind, if
the intention of the regulators is to simply discourage all and any speculation against
a sovereign issuer, then the net should in fact be cast much further than naked
sovereign CDSs to also encompass all such instruments that allow taking positions
on the credit risk of an issuer that benefit from the worsening of a country’s credit
risk.119
Ultimately it is clear that a ban on naked CDSs will not prevent markets reacting
to adverse information, and in the case of sovereigns it would seem far more prudent
to focus on tackling the underlying fiscal problems of a country rather than seeking
to ban the symptoms of the problem.120
4.3 Burning Down Your Neighbour’s House?
It is also relevant here to observe an analogy that particularly surfaced in the media
during the sovereign debt crisis. This suggested that the purchase of a naked
sovereign CDS was akin to buying insurance on your neighbour’s house.121 It was
argued that just as such a situation would give a policyholder an incentive to then
114 Ibid, at p. 58. For instance a ban on CDSs could actually add to the pressure on government bonds
leading to increased bond selling, making it more expensive for governments to borrow or service their
debt. See BBA, European Consultation on short selling: a response by the British Bankers’ Association
(July 2010), at p. 13.
115 AFME, ISLA and ISDA, supra n. 98, at p. 20.
116 D Mason, ‘The Senator has no clothes: why a ban on ‘‘naked’’ credit default swaps is ill-advised and
impractical. The Heritage Foundation, May 2010, at p. 2.
117 AIMA (2011), at p. 13. Indeed, the Commission observed that a ban could easily be circumvented by
investors trading CDSs in non-EU countries and that there was very little the EU regulators could do
about this. See Impact Assessment, supra n. 21, at p. 47; Juurikkala (2012), at p. 340.
118 IMF (2013), at p. 21.
119 Italian Treasury, EC Public Consultation on Short Selling, 9 July 2010, at pp. 3–4. This would
include, for instance, futures and options.
120 Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Bank research: credit default swaps (December 2009), at p. 23; AIMA
(2011), at p. 13.
121 See, e.g., W Mu¨nchau, ‘Time to outlaw naked credit default swaps’, Financial Times, 1 March 2010.
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burn down their neighbour’s house, equally a purchaser of a naked sovereign CDS
would prefer to then see the borrower default. This can also be described as creating
a risk of ‘moral hazard’. For instance, if a market participant purchased a sovereign
CDS without having a proportionate insurable interest in the underlying debt
obligation or exposure to the underlying credit risk, the holder of the CDS could
have a perverse incentive to precipitate a default and obtain the pay-out from the
CDS.122
This analogy starts to breaks down, however, when one bears in mind that the
buyer of the naked sovereign CDS is unlikely to be able to increase the chance of, or
in fact trigger, a borrower defaulting. This is particularly the case given that, as
already observed, the sovereign CDS market only represents a tiny fraction of the
underlying bond market.123 Indeed, as Duffie observed, Greece had already
borrowed far more than it could pay back before CDS rates rose significantly.124
Further, a greater moral hazard may also potentially arise if a CDS protection buyer
is a lender who is hedging its large loan to a sovereign borrower using a sovereign
CDS. Such a lender may no longer be as interested in monitoring the borrower’s
credit quality and could in fact have more of an incentive than a purchaser of a
naked CDS to force the borrower to default: the ‘empty creditor’ problem.125
4.4 Legal Recharacterisation as an Insurance Contract?
Separately, the relationship between naked CDSs and contracts of insurance should
also be considered. Specifically it is clear that the economic effect of a naked CDS
is similar to the effect of an insurance contract against the risk of default without an
insurable interest. Consequently, if such a CDS contract were to be also legally
characterised as an insurance contract it would be void, whereas if termed as a CDS
(in the absence of a ban) it would be valid.126
This question of whether credit derivatives might be legally recharacterised as
insurance contracts was widely debated in the 1990s, and Robin Potts QC was
instructed, on behalf of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA), to provide an Opinion with respect to these concerns. Broadly, he advised
that although insurance contracts and credit derivatives were functionally similar,
credit derivatives were legally distinct as the payment obligation was not
conditional on the payee’s loss and there was no requirement for an insurable
interest.127 With this in mind he concluded that for regulatory purposes, entering
122 Impact Assessment, supra n. 21, at p. 25.
123 Duffie (2010), at p. 58.
124 Ibid, at p. 58.
125 Ibid, at p. 58. See further Hu and Black (2008), p. 625. However, it is also acknowledged that, as
assessment of sovereign creditworthiness largely rests on public information, this may not be of such
relevance as for corporate entities.
126 Hence, the legal treatment will differ depending on the parties’ legal characterisation of the contract.
127 Benjamin (2007), paras. 5.140–5.142.
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them could not be characterised as insurance business.128 The Potts Opinion was
relied on by the whole industry as conclusive,129 and it was subsequently observed
that due to the huge growth of the credit derivatives market the point of no return
had long passed: the consequences of a recharacterisation would be too far-reaching
to be contemplated.130 Further, the correctness of the Potts Opinion was also
subsequently assumed in European legislation, where CDSs have been regulated as
derivative rather than as insurance contracts.131
More generally, however, it should also be noted that the fact that CDSs
resemble insurance is not sufficient to merit regulating them as such. First, many
contracts contain an element of risk sharing or insurance but are not regulated as
insurance contracts.132 Next, the reason insurance regulation does not extend to all
such contracts is due to the precise purpose of insurance regulation.133 In
particular, one of the main justifications for a separate insurance law relates to
concerns about unsophisticated consumers who need protection from entering
contracts they do not understand, and such an argument does not extend to CDSs
where the average market participant is sophisticated and capable of bearing
losses.134 Finally, even if one sought to regulate CDSs that look like insurance,
there would be considerable difficulty in accurately drawing the dividing lines, and
parties could simply contract around the lines and enter equivalent ‘synthetic’ and
unregulated transactions that had the same economic effect.135 Indeed, as will be
observed below, this issue of regulatory arbitrage is now also of particular
relevance with the new European rules.
4.5 Legal Recharacterisation as a Gaming Contract?
A related issue in this context is whether CDS contracts could be recharacterised as
‘gaming’ or ‘wagering’ contracts, as such contracts were historically
128 This also had significance as, if they were so characterised as insurance, financial institutions would
require to be authorised to carry out insurance business and would not be authorised to carry out other
non-insurance business, Gullifer and Payne (2011), at pp. 204–5.
129 Ibid, at p. 205. The view has been questioned, however, see, e.g., Smith (2010), at p. 386, who
observed that the two differences identified by Potts QC did not prevent a CDS being a contract of
insurance.
130 Benjamin (2007), para. 5.143.
131 See, e.g., Council Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default
swaps, OJ L86/1, Art. 2(1)(c). Note, however, that the Regulation’s Recitals provide that sovereign CDSs
should be based on the insurable interest principle, although it has been suggested that the choice of
words reflects a policy intention rather than seeking to re-introduce questions about regulating CDSs as
insurance contracts, see Slaughter and May (2012) The European Regulation on short selling and CDS
(July 2012), at p. 4.
132 Henderson (2009), at pp. 4–5. Henderson provides the example of a farmer who enters into a contract
to allow him to sell his crop at a fixed price in the future (a ‘forward’ contract) and is insuring against an
increase in the price of wheat yet this is not regulated as an insurance contract.
133 Ibid, at pp. 4–6.
134 Gullifer and Payne (2011), at p. 208.
135 Henderson (2009), at p. 33; Gullifer and Payne (2011), at p. 208.
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unenforceable.136 It is unlikely, however, that naked CDSs could be so classified.
First, English case law has held that speculation must be the sole purpose of both
parties to the contract for the term to apply.137 With this in mind it would be very
difficult to show that both parties to a CDS contract were intending purely to
gamble. For instance, many CDS purchasers would be using the contract as a hedge,
whereas the sellers would be seeking to provide a service for a price to make a
profit.138 Further, and more practically, this is no longer an open question as the
Gambling Act 2005 now provides that ‘the fact that a contract relates to gambling
shall not prevent its enforcement’.139
5 EU Regulation: A Ban on Naked Sovereign CDSs
5.1 Articles 4 and 14
Turning to then consider the precise rules introduced by the Regulation, the final rules
are complex, reflecting the Parliament’s desire to prohibit naked sovereign CDS
activity, whilst also seeking to try and enable legitimate hedging behaviour. Article 14
provides that a person may enter into sovereign CDS transactions only where the
transaction does not lead to an uncovered position in a sovereign CDS as referred to in
Article 4.140Article 4 then provides for two types of permitted hedging. First, hedging
is permitted where the sovereign CDS serves to hedge against the risk of default of the
issuer where the person has a long position in the sovereign debt of that issuer to which
the sovereign CDS relates.141 Secondly, proxy hedging is permitted where the
sovereign CDS serves to hedge against the risk of the decline of the value of the
sovereign debt where the person holds assets, or is subject to liabilities, including but
not limited to financial contracts, a portfolio of assets, or financial obligations, the
value of which is correlated to the value of the sovereign debt.142
Proxy hedging is crucial to hedging and risk management in the CDS market;
however, in many cases it can be difficult to clearly distinguish between legitimate
and illegitimate hedging activities.143 Consequently, as will be considered in
136 Benjamin (2007), para. 5.136. See, for instance, Section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845. If this were the
case, there would be no naked CDSs, although there would still be short selling.
137 See Hawkins J in Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1892] 2 QB 489, 491.
138 Smith (2010), at p. 406.
139 Section 335(1); Benjamin (2007), para. 5.144.
140 Regulation 236/2012, Art. 14(1). However, the Article 14 restrictions do not apply to market makers,
see Art. 17(1). Further, to exclude retroactive effect, transactions resulting in an uncovered position in a
sovereign CDS that were concluded before 25 March 2012 may be held to the maturity date of the CDS
contract, see Art. 46(2).
141 Ibid, Art. 4(1)(a).
142 Ibid, Art. 4(1)(b).
143 Moloney (2014), at p. 542; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 918/2012 supplementing
Regulation No 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps with regard to
definitions, the calculation of net short positions, covered sovereign credit default swaps, notification
thresholds, liquidity thresholds for suspending restrictions, significant falls in the value of financial
instruments and adverse events, OJ 274/1, Recital 6.
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Sect. 5.2 below, the related technical rules introduce a complex set of requirements
that are tricky for market participants to meet with complete certainty in practice.
5.2 Delegated Regulation 918/2012: Conditions
5.2.1 Geographical Scope
First, although a wide range of exposures can be hedged,144 the use of sovereign
CDS to hedge cross-border risks is not generally permissible. ESMA stated that it
was the intention of the co-legislators that the geographical scope of the rules should
not be drawn too broadly,145 and there are only very limited exceptions to this
(provided the correlation test is also met).146
The geographical requirements are problematic, particularly as such constraints
could limit responsible risk management. Specifically, there may be several
legitimate reasons for hedging a risk in one Member State with a sovereign CDS
related to a reference entity in another Member State.147 For instance, a market
participant may have sovereign debt exposure to Germany but may want to buy
sovereign CDS protection on Denmark, as the Danish sovereign CDS is highly
correlated with, but is also a cheaper proxy for, German debt.148
Further, it is also likely that such geographical restrictions could contradict core
principles of the EU’s single market: for instance, even if market participants meet
the correlation test, they could still be prohibited from trading in a particular
sovereign CDS simply because the instruments were issued in a different Member
State.149 This sits uncomfortably with the vision of a single European financial
market and could in fact provide a disincentive in relation to cross-border
business.150
Likewise, despite ESMA observing that it was the co-legislators’ intention that
the geographical scope of the rules should not be drawn too widely, when one
considers the wording of the Regulation itself, it does not explicitly state that
hedging can only be within one Member State.151 Article 4 is silent on this issue,
144 See ibid, Art. 17.
145 ESMA, Technical advice on possible delegated acts concerning the Regulation on short selling and
certain aspects of credit default swaps ((EC) No 236/2012), Final Report ESMA 2012/263, April 2012, at
p. 39.
146 For instance, where the sovereign CDS references the sovereign Member State of a parent company
that gives credit support to a subsidiary in another Member State, a sovereign CDS position will not be
considered uncovered where it is to hedge exposure to the subsidiary, Delegated Regulation 918/2012,
Art. 15(1)(a).
147 AFME and ISDA, ESMA Call for Evidence, 15 March 2013, at p. 37.
148 ‘Short selling and CDS regulation in EU: less to nakedness than meets the eye, funds and firms
argue’, Reuters, 5 March 2012.
149 AFME and ISDA, supra n. 147, at p. 37.
150 Ibid, at p. 37. For instance, it could encourage companies to conduct business in their home country as
counterparties would be better able to hedge their exposures to entities in the home Member State.
151 Managed Funds Association, Response to Consultation on draft technical standards on possible
delegated acts, March 2012, at pp. 11–12.
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and Recital 21 states that such interests ‘include’ hedging against the risk of default
of a sovereign issuer. Recital 21 then provides examples of a wide range of
exposures that could be eligible for hedging and although the Recital does refer to
hedging exposure ‘in the Member State concerned’ this is arguably an example
rather than a requirement that hedging can only be within one Member state.152
5.2.2 Proportionality
Next, there is a broad proportionality requirement: the size of the sovereign CDS
position must be proportionate to the size of the exposure that is being hedged. As
matching assets and liabilities to create a perfect hedge is difficult in practice due to
the diverse characteristics of different assets and liabilities, as well as the volatility
in their values, an exact match is not required under the rules.153 If the exposure
being hedged is liquidated or redeemed, however, it must either be replaced by
equivalent exposures, or the CDS position must be reduced or otherwise disposed
of.154
The proportionality requirement reflects ESMA’s technical advice and has the
benefit of avoiding overly narrow rules.155 However, on a more practical note, the
position holder cannot be hedged only when the transaction is entered into, it must
maintain a continuously hedged position proportionate to the size of the
exposure.156
152 Ibid, at p. 12. Indeed, when the Delegated Regulation was being drafted there were considerable
differences of view as to whether cross-border hedging was permissible. For instance, a member of
ESMA’s board of supervisors was quoted as saying that although it was not entirely clear from the
wording of the Regulation whether cross-border hedging was exempt or not, ESMA had received a ‘very
strong position’ from the Commission’s legal services that it was not exempt, see, e.g., ‘Short selling and
CDS regulation in EU: less to nakedness than meets the eye, funds and firms argue’, supra n. 148, at p. 2.
153 Delegated Regulation 918/2012, Art. 19(1). Limited over-provision is permitted in accordance with
Art. 19(2).
154 Ibid, Art. 19(3). Art. 20 also provides for the method of calculation of an uncovered CDS position.
The calculation of a person’s position shall be of the net sovereign CDS position (i.e., any sales of the
relevant sovereign CDS shall be deducted from the purchased CDS). When calculating the value of
eligible assets or liabilities hedged or to be hedged by the CDS, a distinction is also made between static
and dynamic hedging strategies (for further details, see Appendix 1). The value of the eligible portfolio of
assets or liabilities is then deducted from the value of the net CDS position and if the resulting number is
positive (i.e., the CDS position exceeds the value of the portfolio of exposures to be hedged), the position
shall be considered uncovered. See further ESMA, supra n. 145, at pp. 43-44; Credit Suisse, The
Regulation on short selling and certain aspects of CDS, Fixed Income Research, October 2012.
155 Juurikkala (2012, at p. 330.
156 Sidley Austin (2012), at p. 5.
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5.2.3 Correlation
Finally, correlation is a key test to eligibility. The test is one of ‘simple
correlation’157 and the Delegated Regulation sets out alternative quantitative or
qualitative correlation tests.158 ESMA’s earlier technical advice proposed a purely
qualitative approach, but the Commission chose to include both tests, observing that
this was in line with the only EU precedent: the unilateral German ban.159
The quantitative correlation test is met by showing a ‘Pearson’s correlation
coefficient’ of at least 70 per cent between the price of the assets or liabilities and
the price of the sovereign debt calculated on a historical basis using data for at least
a period of 12 months of trading days immediately preceding the date when the
sovereign CDS position was taken out.160 Although this test benefits from being
precise and objective,161 the requirement that it be calculated on a historical basis
fails to take into account the fact that past correlation may change over time, or the
correlation may not yet exist in relation to situations of legitimate hedging of future
risks.162
The qualitative correlation test provides that the test shall be met by showing
‘meaningful’ correlation: this is a correlation which is based on ‘appropriate’ data
and is not evidence of a ‘merely temporary dependence’.163 However, it is unclear
what will be sufficient to satisfy this test. Although the qualitative limb has likely
been included so that market participants can capture a broader range of correlated
assets, relying on this test could be risky in practice.164 For instance, where a market
participant is called on to justify that the qualitative test has been met, a party could
breach the prohibition if it cannot then demonstrate to the regulator that the data
157 ESMA, supra n. 145, at p. 39. Note that this contrasts with the degree of correlation prescribed in
relation to calculating net short positions in sovereign debt, where the Regulation refers to a test of ‘high
correlation’, see Regulation 236/2012, Art. 3(5). Likewise, the Regulation’s restrictions on uncovered
short sales in sovereign debt do not apply if the transaction serves to hedge a long position in debt
instruments on an issuer, the pricing of which has a ‘high correlation’ with the pricing of the sovereign
debt, see ibid, Art. 13(2).
158 Delegated Regulation 918/2012, Art. 18(1). Some self-evident cases where the correlation test is
deemed to have been met are set out in ibid, Art. 18(2), such as where the exposure being hedged relates
to an enterprise which is owned by the sovereign issuer.
159 ESMA, supra n. 145, at p. 39; European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the
Proposal for Delegated Regulation 918/2012 SWD(2012) 198, at p. 28.
160 Delegated Regulation 918/2012, Art. 18(1)(a). For further details on Pearson’s correlation coefficient,
see Appendix 1.
161 Delegated Regulation Impact Assessment, supra n. 159, at p. 27.
162 AFME and ISDA, supra n. 147, at p. 36. For example, in general, it will not be possible to use
sovereign CDSs to hedge ‘tail risk’ events, see further Appendix 1. See also Managed Funds Association,
supra n. 151, at p. 15. Further, the adoption of a historic test is linked to an assumption that the past is the
only guide to the future and in other areas of financial markets this is held to be unreliable (for instance,
the phrase ‘past performance is not a guide to future performance’ is often used in the context of
providing financial services to retail clients).
163 Delegated Regulation 918/2012, Art. 18(1)(b). The time frame for the calculation is set out (broadly
using the historical basis of the previous twelve months but an alternative time frame can be used).
164 Credit Suisse, supra n. 154, at p. 8.
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relied on was appropriate.165 Indeed, due to the uncertainties as to whether either
correlation test will be satisfied, sovereign CDSs may not be used to hedge
exposures, and this will lead to a shift to other instruments.166
These concerns have been borne out in practice. Specifically, from August
2011 onwards, volumes of net notional European CDSs started to sharply
decline, and this could have been in part due to short positions being unwound
in advance of the Regulation’s introduction.167 In fact, some market participants
indicated that positions were being unwound as it was feared that the hedging
rules were ‘so vague’ that they could be viewed as speculating even if they were
not.168 Market participants also observed anecdotally that Asian participation in
the European bond market had fallen to under fifty per cent since the
Regulation’s introduction, suggesting that the restrictions could be driving
investors away.169
Further, there has also been a sharp decline in the volumes traded on the
European sovereign CDS indices, resulting in significantly reduced liquidity.
Broadly speaking, CDS contracts on a basket of reference entities are known as ‘so
called index and tranche’ CDSs.170 Such indices comprise of many reference
entities with a theme in common (e.g., European sovereigns). The index is
composed of the fifteen constituents with the largest sum of weekly trading activity,
and entities are weighted equally in the index.171 Every 6 months, a new ‘series’ of
the index is introduced, updating the set of constituents in the index. Since the
Regulation came into force, volumes traded on the main European sovereign CDS
index, the Markit iTraxx SovX Western Europe Index (‘SovX’ index), have
declined one hundred per cent (i.e., the index has essentially been shut down).172
Markit (the index provider) also announced that, until further notice, no new series
of the index would be published.173 This has also resulted in the creation of a new
sub-index for SovX, known as ‘ex-EU’: constituents that do not form part of the
European Economic Area.174 Again, this only serves to further demonstrate that the
165 Travers Smith, Short selling: remember, remember the first of November, 26 October 2012, at p. 3.
Separately, however, it should also be observed that the Regulation does not specify penalties for
infringement and only requires that these be established by the Member States. This means that penalties
may vary widely between countries and that the rules could ultimately be an ineffective deterrent. See
Regulation 236/2012, Art. 41; Juurikkala (2012), at p. 340.
166 AFME and ISDA, supra n. 147, at p. 11.
167 ESMA, Technical advice on the evaluation of Regulation (EU) 236/2012 on short selling and certain
aspects of credit default swaps, June 2013, at p. 90; IMF (2013), at p. 17. The IMF noted that Italy was the
exception to this and that this could be due to Italy having substantial uncollateralised positions with a
number of banks that were using sovereign CDSs to hedge the counterparty risk on these contracts.
168 IMF (2013), at p. 17.
169 AFME and ISDA, supra n. 147, at p. 11.
170 IOSCO (2012), at p. 12.
171 Markit, Markit iTraxx Sovx: a global sovereign CDS index family, September 2014, at pp. 3–4.
172 Deutsche Bank, ESMA Call for Evidence (15 March 2013) at p. 9.
173 Markit, supra n. 171, at p. 4.
174 Deutsche Bank, ESMA Call for Evidence, supra n. 172, at p. 9.
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Regulation’s constraints have negatively impacted the use of sovereign CDS
indices, including for responsible risk management.175
5.2.4 Opt-out
Turning then to the ability to temporarily suspend the restrictions, the Parliament
was forced to concede to this possibility during the Regulation’s negotiations, and
the rules provide for a temporary ‘opt-out’ provision. Consequently, the constraints
may be temporarily suspended by a national competent authority (NCA) where it
has objective grounds for believing that its debt market is not functioning properly
and that such restrictions may have a negative impact on the sovereign CDS market,
especially by increasing the cost of borrowing for sovereign issuers or affecting the
ability to issue new debt.176 Such grounds include high or rising interest rates on the
sovereign debt, and a widening of sovereign CDS spreads compared with other
issuers.177
Before suspending any restrictions, the authority must notify ESMA and the other
NCAs (and ESMA shall issue an opinion within twenty-four hours but has no veto
option).178 A suspension is valid for an initial twelve-month period and can be
renewed for six-month periods.179 Where an NCA suspends restrictions, notifica-
tions of uncovered positions will then be required on reaching or falling below
relevant thresholds.180 Further, it should also be observed that although ESMA has
been granted broad powers in the Regulation with respect to other financial
instruments in emergency situations, sovereign debt is expressly excluded.181 In
such scenarios ESMA has very limited powers, including, for instance, the right to
be fully informed of relevant developments.182
It is somewhat ironic that an opt-out has been included in the rules in the event
that the CDS restrictions increase the cost of borrowing for sovereign issuers when
this was precisely the rationale behind introducing the provisions in the first place.
175 ESMA, supra n. 167, at pp. 27-8. Indeed, and on a related point, the geographical constraints also
preclude the use of such European sovereign CDS indices for general EU risks that do not include all
Member States or pan-euro Member States in the index. In particular, the ability to use sovereign CDS
indices for cross-country hedge credit valuation adjustments concerning exposures in several Member
States has been restricted (broadly, such credit valuation adjustments account for the risk of possible
changes to the credit quality of a counterparty in a derivatives transaction). Such a limitation is also
counter to the post-crisis European banking reforms that include the use of index CDSs for the purpose of
mitigating such risk, see Deutsche Bank, ESMA Call for Evidence, supra n. 172, at p. 9.
176 Regulation 236/2012, Art. 14(2). Note that the relevant competent authority in relation to sovereign
debt of a Member State is defined in Art. 2(1)(j)(i) as the competent authority of that Member State to
which the CDS relates, see also Juurikkala (2012), at p. 334.
177 Regulation 236/2012, Art. 14(2)(a)–(e).
178 Ibid, Art. 14(2). Separately, note that in exceptional circumstances competent authorities can also
restrict the ability to enter into covered sovereign CDS positions, see ibid, Art. 21.
179 Ibid, Art. 14(2).
180 Ibid, Art. 8.
181 For a discussion of ESMA’s powers in the Regulation and the related UK’s constitutional challenge to
these powers, see, e.g., Howell (2014), at p. 454.
182 Regulation 236/2012, Art. 29; Juurikkala (2012), at pp. 335–6.
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Indeed, there is also an added paradox here in that it is precisely at the times when
such opt-out powers can be exercised with respect to sovereign CDSs that regulators
may also be restricting other forms of short selling.183
5.3 Impact of the Sovereign CDS Restrictions
Regulatory intervention brings significant risks with it, and the imposition of
restrictions in the area of sovereign CDSs is all the more concerning when there is
little indication that such activity raises sovereign funding costs.184 Indeed, there are
many benefits to using sovereign CDSs, yet little to substantiate the allegations aired
by governments and regulators during the sovereign debt crisis. With this in mind,
the EU rules that have been introduced in this area are an example of a
‘misconceived response to a non-existent problem’.185
It is recognised that, given the relatively short period the Regulation has been
in operation, plus the improved situation in the sovereign debt markets, it is hard
to fully ascertain the effect that the sovereign CDS restrictions have had.186
Nevertheless, as ESMA’s evaluation of the Regulation (hereinafter ‘the Evalu-
ation’) also demonstrates, it does appear clear that the sovereign CDS restrictions
seem to be driving participants away from using the sovereign CDS market in
practice. In particular, ESMA’s Evaluation illustrates that the sovereign CDS
constraints have led to a predictable shift to other asset classes: for instance, open
interest in futures contracts has increased (especially on French and Italian
bonds).187 Indeed, such activity will always occur when regulation covers only
one aspect of a market: market participants will seek to avoid the additional costs
of regulation and will redirect their market activity to the unregulated market: the
‘boundary problem’.188
In the context of sovereign CDSs this poses a problem for regulators since there
are ‘literally an infinite number of potential contracts and contract forms that can be
used by investors to share and transfer credit risk’.189 Indeed, aside from the
observed shifts to government future contracts, participants can also choose to short
183 Juurikkala (2012), at pp. 337–8. Further, such decisions may not necessarily be made by the same
regulator. For instance, the relevant competent authority for sovereign CDSs are covered by the regulator
of the Member State to which the CDS relates. In contrast, the relevant competent authority for shares and
other financial instruments is the national regulator controlling the most relevant market in terms of
liquidity for that instrument, see Regulation 236/2012, Art. 2(1)(j)(i) and (v).
184 Moloney (2014), at p. 542; IMF (2013), at p. 2.
185 Seretakis (2013), at p. 146.
186 Indeed, it has also been observed that peripheral sovereigns were more stable following the
announcement of the outright monetary transactions (OMT) plan by the European Central Bank (ECB) in
September 2012. Broadly, this plan enables government bond buying by the ECB: it can engage in OMTs
to address distortions in the government bond markets, provided the country complies with certain strict
requirements in relation to their economic policies, see, e.g., ‘ECB’s Mario Draghi unveils bond-buying
euro debt plan’, BBC News, 6 September 2012.
187 ESMA, supra n. 167, at p. 94.
188 Brunnermeier et al. (2009), Appendix; Henderson (2009), at p. 33.
189 Henderson (2009), at p. 33.
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the underlying bonds, use corporate CDSs190 as a proxy for a sovereign CDS, and
also utilise more opaque and customised OTC derivatives contracts. Further, there
are also regulatory inconsistencies that enhance this issue through policymakers
choosing to treat sovereign CDSs differently to corporate CDSs. With this in mind,
regulators should not hold too much confidence in the European sovereign CDS
restrictions proscribing contracting in the marketplace.191
It is also clear that the rules may reduce investor interest in the underlying bond
market in many countries, and this could raise the cost of debt issuance for such
sovereign issuers: precisely what the rules were seeking to prevent.192 Finally,
although commercial parties may work out with time how to ‘game’ the rules to
their advantage,193 this does not excuse the introduction of an unreasonable ban in
the first place.
6 Conclusion
The unsubstantiated accusations that speculative CDS activity aggravated the
financial problems of sovereign issuers during the sovereign debt crisis resulted in
the introduction of a permanent prohibition on all naked sovereign CDS activity.
Indeed, the Regulation’s restrictions go much further than only prohibiting
uncovered positions and also eliminate much legitimate hedging activity. Market
participants are rightly anxious of not satisfying opaque correlation tests, and the
geographical limitations are also of concern, running counter to the principles
behind a single European market.
The paper suggests that this regulatory intervention is unjustified, and that market
participants, including those not targeted by the ban, are withdrawing from the
market.194 Activity will simply be transferred to other, less transparent markets, and
the restrictions may also have the unintended consequence of reducing interest in
the sovereign bond market. The economic literature and evidence that the paper has
considered does not support the introduction of a ban: rather, it would have been far
more sensible to have engaged in tackling the underlying fiscal problems of
particular Member States than simply seeking to prohibit the symptoms of the
problem.
Finally, although commercial parties may work out how to use the rules to their
advantage, this does not merit the introduction of the rules in the first place. One
should always remain wary of ‘knee-jerk’ regulatory reforms, and in this regard it is
perhaps the policymakers and not the speculators who have sold us short.
190 Indeed, it has also been argued that the corporate CDS market faces a stronger theoretical rationale
for regulation than the sovereign market, see Juurikkala (2012), at p. 331.
191 With thanks to Professors John Armour and Luca Enriques for their comments in this regard.
192 AIMA, AIMA/MFA Response to the Call for Evidence by ESMA, 15 March 2013, at p. 11; IMF
(2013), at p. 17. This is particularly so where such countries do not have alternative markets for
expressing views about negative sovereign credit risk.
193 For instance, ambiguities inherent in the drafting of the rules could grant commercial participants
more room to manoeuvre around the restrictions going forward.
194 IMF (2013), at p. 21.
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Appendix 1
Basis points One basis point is equal to 1/100th of one per cent. A one per
cent change is equal to one hundred basis points
Basis trading Arbitrage trading where traders try to exploit pricing differences
between CDSs and the underlying debt obligations by taking
offsetting positions between the two. For instance, depending
on the basis, a trader can purchase the underlying bond and
buy CDS protection and lock in a risk-free profit, and vice
versa
CDS premium or spread Specified fee payments the CDS purchaser is obliged to make on
an annual basis. If the premium or spread increases, this means
that the likelihood of an entity defaulting is increasing
‘Dynamic’ hedging strategy A strategy that accommodates constant changes in risk exposure,
such as credit value adjustments (such adjustments account for
the risk that the creditworthiness of the counterparty
deteriorates)
Granger causality tests Broadly, this is a statistical concept of causality based on
prediction that can be used in determining a weak form of
causality. However, such tests can suffer from limitations
where variables are omitted
Hedging ‘tail risk’ events Tail risk is similar to an anticipated correlation. Although an
asset may not be correlated with a sovereign CDS on a day-to-
day basis, it would be expected to have a high level of
correlation if there was a tail risk event, such as severe market
turmoil. Such hedging is an important risk mitigation tool and
is usually encouraged by regulators. In general, however, it is
not possible to use a sovereign CDS to hedge against tail risk
events
Notional amount The level of CDS protection is usually expressed in terms of a
notional amount being protected
Naked or uncovered sovereign CDS Where an investor purchases a sovereign CDS without having
some kind of exposure to the credit risk associated with the
underlying bond
Pearson’s correlation coefficient Broadly, this is a statistic that measures the correlation between
sets of data. It is a measure (between -1 and ?1) of how well
the sets of data are related
Proxy hedging Hedging risks of other assets whose value is correlated to the
value of the sovereign debt
‘Static’ hedging strategy Where the sovereign CDS position is hedging a direct exposure
to a sovereign or public sector body in the sovereign
‘Trade tear-ups’ (also referred to as
‘portfolio compression’)
This is an industry technique that broadly means that
economically redundant derivatives trades are terminated early
without changing the net position of each market participant
Vector Error Correction Model
(VECM)
Cointegrated variables move together in the long run but there
can be deviations from each other in the short run, which
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Appendix 2: Overview of Main Empirical Studies: Interaction Between
the Sovereign CDS and Bond Markets195
Emerging Markets
continued
means they follow an adjustment process towards equilibrium.
A model that considers this adjustment process is the VECM.
This model also has its drawbacks however: it requires the
CDS-bond basis to be sufficiently ‘stable’ or stationary and
therefore limits it to those countries that have a stable basis (far
from all countries)
Chan-Lau and Kim (2004)
Period March 2001–May 2003
Purpose of
study
The authors examine whether the bond or sovereign CDS market leads the other
Data set They test a sample of 8 emerging market countries using daily data.a To undertake
cross-country comparisons, they used country bond indices,b and CDS spreads were
mid-price quotes on 5-year contracts
Main findings Very mixed results and the authors state it is very difficult to conclude that one market
particularly dominated in terms of price discovery
a The authors use both VECM and Granger causality measures. It is recognised that, as these are
emerging market countries, it is difficult to know how generalisable the findings are
b Note that using indices lacks the transparency to enable a price comparison between the CDSs and the
actual underlying bonds
Levy (2009)
Period Approximately 4 years (between 2000–2008)
Purpose of
study
To explain pricing deviations between sovereign CDS premiums and bond spreads, the
author focuses on two frictions: liquidity and counterparty risk
Data set The author uses daily data on 5-year sovereign CDS premiums (daily quotes) and
5-year sovereign bond yields (daily quotes) for 16 emerging market countries
Main findings The findings strongly support the relevance of these two frictions to the pricing of
CDSs. The relative illiquidity of CDSs has a positive effect on CDS prices, and
counterparty risk has a negative effect on CDS prices. The findings also support the
suggestion that changes in the relative liquidity of the two markets could explain why
there was no consistent pattern of one market leading the other: price discovery took
place on the market where there was higher liquidity on a given day
195 Note that the literature largely adopts a common approach to testing whether the two markets are
integrated, i.e., it considers whether they are characterised by a long-term stationary relationship and then
looks at short-term deviations from this to work out which market adapts to the other. The literature uses
either a standard information measure to assess contribution to price discovery (either a ‘Hasbrouck’
or ‘Gonzalo and Granger’ information measure) that is based on a VECM model, or a ‘Granger causality’
model (a statistical concept of causality based on prediction).
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European Sovereign Debt Crisis
Ammer and Cai (2011)
Period February 2001–March 2005
Purpose of
study
The authors examine whether the bond or sovereign CDS markets lead the other
Data set They use daily data on 5-year dollar-denominated sovereign CDS premiums and daily
estimates of the yield on a 5-year par coupon dollar sovereign bond. They examine 9
emerging economies
Main findings Results suggest sovereign CDS market seems to lead bond market in price discovery
only in some instances and lag bond prices in others.a The authors also conclude that
the relative liquidity of the two markets is a key determinant of where price discovery
occurredb
a The authors use the VECM analysis. Again, given these are emerging market countries, it is difficult to
know how generalisable these findings are
b Broadly, they suggested that since much of the relevant information with respect to sovereign credit
risk tends to be in the public domain, new information might be reflected in observed prices more quickly
in the more liquid market (cf. corporate market: if this market is driven more by informed trading, then
price discovery may occur in the least transparent market that might tend to be the less liquid market).
This contrasts with Arce et al.’s findings that are discussed further below, which found that the degree of
liquidity does not affect price discovery (Arce et al. 2013)
Commission Task Force Report (2010)
Period 2008–1st quarter of 2010
Purpose of
study
The authors examine sovereign CDS activity during the European sovereign debt crisis
to establish whether the bond or CDS market preceded or lagged the other
Data set Empirical analysis of 18 EU countries:
(1) They authors use correlation analysis to show whether price changes on one of the
two markets preceded the others between 2009–2010
(2) They then take this further using Granger causality tests. They examine the period
between 2008–1st quarter of 2010a
Main findings No evidence of obvious mispricing in either the CDS or the bond market, and CDS
spreads are cheap relative to bond spreads
Correlation analysis shows that spreads in the two markets are mainly
contemporaneous
Granger causality tests find price discovery is equally likely to occur in either market
(for Greece and Italy, the bond market seemed to be the more important market; for
Spain and Ireland, the CDS market seemed to be more important; for Portugal, it
went both ways)
a The report noted the VECM analysis but also observed its drawbacks (i.e., requiring CDS-bond basis to
be sufficiently stable and this would limit the analysis to those countries with such a stable basis)
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Fontana and Scheicher (ECB Working Paper 2010)
Period January 2006–July 2010
Purpose of
study
As part of a broader study the authors analyse which market leads in the pricing process
Data set Although weekly data is used for other aspects of their research, they use daily data on
CDS and bond spreads to obtain a better overview of the pricing dynamics. They
examine 10-year CDS and bond spreads for 10 euro area countriesa
Main findings In line with the Task Force Report, the authors find that in half the sample countries
price discovery takes place in the CDS market and in the other half it is observed in
the bond market. (They found the bond market has a predominant role in Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium; and the CDS market has a major role
for the PIIGS countries)
a The authors use the VECM analysis and 10-year spreads as this is a common horizon for government
bonds
Delis and Mylondis (2011)
Period January 2005–May 2010
Purpose of
study
The authors examine the interrelation between government bond spreads and CDSs
Data set Daily data on 10-year government bond yields and 10-year euro-denominated CDS mid
bid-ask prices for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spaina
Main findings The authors suggest that in times of high stress, investors have a higher preference for
less risky and more liquid securities and generally this benefits government bonds as
they are typically regarded as less risky than other asset classes. During the debt
crisis, however, South European bonds became more risky and their spreads to
German government bonds soared. The authors conclude that in such times the ‘flight
to safety’ to the German government bond market becomes more pronounced (fewer
would be trading South European bonds and CDSs), disrupting the transmission
mechanism from CDS to bond spreads. Notably they conclude that the findings
mitigate the common conception of speculative attacks on countries’ default
a The authors use ‘rolling’ Granger causality tests and include an error correction term to account for the
existence of cointegration between CDS and bond spreads
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Palladini and Portes (2011)
Period January 2004–March 2011
Purpose of
study
The authors examine the price discovery relationship between CDS spreads and
sovereign bond yields
Data set They examine 6 European countries using daily 5-year sovereign bond yields and CDS
spreadsa
Main findings Findings suggest that the CDS market plays a leadership role in terms of price
discovery. Results are more in line with those relating to corporate credit risk
a The authors use the VECM analysis and Granger causality tests
O’Kane (2012)
Period January 2008–January 2011
Purpose of
study
The author examines the relationship between sovereign CDSs and bonds
Data set He considers the PIIGS countries and France and examines the daily close prices on
5-year CDSs and bondsa
Main findings The author finds price discovery is evenly split between the CDS and bond markets. He
finds the dominant direction was CDSs to bonds for Greece; bonds to CDSs for Italy
and France; and Portugal and Ireland exhibit causality in both directions
a O’Kane uses the Granger causality measure as he found that cointegration was ruled out for all
countries aside from France and Spain
Coudert and Gex (2013)
Period January 2007–March 2010
Purpose of
study
The authors examine the interaction between the CDS and bond markets
Data set They use daily data: generic 5-year CDS premia and matching bond spreads for 18
countries (11 European and 7 emerging countries)a
Main findings They find that bond markets tend to lead sovereign CDS markets in line with huge size
of government debt markets compared with CDS markets. Results are more mitigated
for high-yield countries however
a The authors use the VECM measure; however, they investigate short-term interactions using Granger
causality but note that cointegration can lead to spurious results when Granger causality is used
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Arce, Mayordomo and Pen˜a (2013)
Period January 2004–February 2012
Purpose of
study
The authors examine which market leads the credit risk price discovery process
Data set Daily 5-year sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads for 11 European Monetary Union
(EMU) countriesa
Main findings Analysis reveals that price discovery is ‘state dependent’ (broadly, this means that
different market conditions and factors affect it). For instance, levels of counterparty
risk affect the ability of the CDS market to lead the price discovery process, whereas
funding costs (that affect bond buyers more than CDS buyers) worsens the efficiency
of the bond marketb
Findings suggest that the CDS market leads price discovery in most euro areas in
normal times but during times of acute stress in the eurozone the bond market leads
the price discovery processc
a The authors extend the VECM analysis over time using ‘rolling windows’ (of 1000 days)
b They also suggested that other factors impaired the ability of the CDS market to lead the price
discovery process. Factors included the common volatility in the EMU equity markets (the authors
suggested that information in bond spreads may be more reliable at such times) and banks’ agreements to
accept losses on their holdings of Greek bonds without activating CDS contracts (they suggested this
meant there was a lack of confidence in the CDS market after such agreements). Factors affecting the
ability of the bond market to lead the price discovery process included investors’ flight to the safest
financial assets (the authors suggested this could diminish the demand of most EMU countries’ debt) and
ECB intervention in the bond market (they suggested that if the ECB’s demand for debt is relatively
insensitive to price, the information embedded in prices formed could reveal less about the fundamental
value of the bonds)
c Notably the authors find that the degree of liquidity in the CDS market relative to the bond market does
not affect the price discovery process (in contrast to, e.g., Ammer and Cai (2011)). They attribute this
finding to the special features of the period (i.e., a period of financial stress and limited access to funding).
The authors suggest that at such times a major determinant of the degree of investors’ participation in the
bond market will be the availability and cost of funding rather than the size of the bid-ask spread. The
relative importance of the bid-ask spread could also be of secondary importance when big players such as
the ECB are buying bonds without regard to it
BIS (2013)
Period October 2008–May 2011
Purpose of
study
BIS examines which market is most important in terms of price discovery of sovereign
credit risk
Data set Intraday quotes for PIIGs, France and Germany. As the number of transactions of
sovereign bonds is largely insufficient to conduct meaningful intraday analysis, BIS
uses the trading book or ‘best proposal’ quotes from the respective domestic markets.
It also uses 5 and 10-year USD-denominated sovereign CDS quotesa
Main findings BIS finds that CDS prices tend to move first in response to news and that bond prices
tend to adjust towards pricing in the CDS marketb
a BIS uses a VECM approach
b BIS observed that its findings could not directly be used to address the extent to which higher CDS
spreads were likely to result in higher bond market credit spreads and lower bond prices than would be
warranted by fundamentals
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